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Review Essays
Wartime Lies: Securing the Holocaust in
Law and Literature
Lawrence Douglas*
Who bears witness for the witness?
Paul Celan
People had always asked me, why aren't you writing a novel? And
I would always say, I have no novel to write ....
Louis Begley
INTRODUCTION
In Louis Begley's remarkable work of Holocaust fiction, Wartime
Lies,' the narrator muses, "The issue was the limit of one's inven-
tiveness and memory."'2 The "issue" refers to the narrator's struggles,
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within the context of the novel, to conceal his Jewish identity, yet the
"limit" of which he speaks can be understood as standing for the
pervasive problem of representing the Holocaust. As an event that
"has changed the basis for the continuity of the conditions of life
within history,"3 the Holocaust has raised crucial questions concern-
ing the capacity of various representational grammars to describe,
explain, and make sense of the Nazi genocide.4 These questions,
while of pressing concern to professional historians,5 apply with equal
force to those discourses, such as the juridical and the fictional, that
are often enlisted to support the project of securing history in
responsible memory.
The claim that the law can play a valuable role in making the past
intelligible is a proposition accepted by most legal theorists and
historians. Like the discipline of history, the law remains anchored to
a factual record that must be investigated and probed with an eye
toward organizing events and actions into a coherent narrative
embedded within a normative framework.6 As Ronald Dworkin has
argued, the greatest ordering effects of the law come not through
agencies of regulation or through the coercive administration of
juridical decree, but through the filtering and assimilation of the past
into practices of interpretation.' In the case of the Holocaust, an
appreciation of the special role that law can play in securing an
adequate understanding of the past largely prompted the Allies at the
end of World War II to agree upon a juridical response to Nazi
crimes. The Nuremberg Trials, the Allies maintained, were less an
instrument of retribution than one of pedagogy, in which the law
3. Jtlrgen Habermas, Eine Art Schadensabwicklung (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1987), 163; also
in The New Conservatism." Cultural Criticism and the Historians' Debate, ed. Shierry Weber
Nicholsen (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1989).
4. As Anton Kaes has observed, "The insistence on the impossibility of adequately
comprehending and describing the final solution has by now become a topos of Holocaust
research." Anton Kaes, "Holocaust and the End of History: Postmoder Historiography in
Cinema," in Probing the Limits of Representation, ed. Saul Friedlander (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1992), 207.
5. Addressing his fellow historians, Hayden white asks, "Are there any limits on the kind
of story that can responsibly be told about these phenomena?" Hayden White, "Historical
Emplotment and the Problem of Truth," in Friedlander, Probing the Limits of Representation,
37.
6. See, for example, John T. Noonan, Persons and Masks of the Law (New York: Farrar,
Straus, Giroux, 1976); Theodore Y. Blumoff, "The Third Best Choice: An Essay on Law and
History," Hastings Law Journal 41 (1990): 537-76; Hayden White, The Content of Form
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987).
7. See Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986).
Indeed, the very concept of precedent exemplifies the normative force of the past: the manner
in which the historical can be said to issue in principles and commitments that bind the present
and future. See also Harold J. Berman, "The Origins of Historical Jurisprudence," Yale Law
Journal 103 (1994): 1651-738.
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would provide a public forum for historical instruction and neutral
judgment.
8
The claim that imaginative literature also has an important role to
play in safeguarding historical truth remains more contentious. On
the one hand, a growing number of legal scholars have sought
instruction in the exclusions of legal discourse by turning to works of
fiction, finding in novelistic representations those voices and experi-
ences frequently silenced or ignored in the law.9 On the other hand,
scholars of the Holocaust have expressed concerns about searching for
historical clarification in the world of fiction. They argue that to
aestheticize the past is to trivialize it, warning that the very act of
fictionalizing history can be exploited by those who claim the
Holocaust is itself a fiction.
In this Essay, I will defend the idea that imaginative literature
about the Holocaust can serve the end of responsible memory.
Specifically, I will consider how Begley's Wartime Lies, a widely
praised novel about survival during the Nazi genocide, justifies the fic-
tionalizing of history and, in so doing, calls into question the idea that
historical and juridical discourses enjoy a special privilege in safe-
guarding the memory of the Holocaust. The novel does so, however,
not simply by supporting the position that literature supplies a more
complete portrait of the past than the law. Wartime Lies vindicates
the prerogatives of fiction, I will argue, less because it provides a
poignant narrative of the Holocaust, than because it defines, in
exemplary fashion, the limits of such representations-whether
imaginatively or juridically conceived.
I. POLICING HOLOCAUST FICTIONS
Holocaust scholars such as Lawrence Langer have defended the
notion that the Nazi genocide can only be adequately grasped through
the idiom of the imagination," but many more have warned of the
dangers of submitting the history of the Holocaust to the devices of
fiction. Adorno, in a frequently quoted, though dimly understood
aphorism, observed: "After Auschwitz, to write a poem is bar-
8. See Telford Taylor, The Anatomy of the Nuremberg Trials (Boston: Little, Brown, 1992).
9. See, for example, Robin West, Narrative, Authority and Law (Ann Arbor. University of
Michigan Press, 1993); Robin West, "Communities, Texts, and Law: Reflections on the Law and
Literature Movement," Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities 1 (1988): 129-56. See also
Richard Weisberg, Poethics: And Other Strategies of Law and Literature (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1992).
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baric."' Although Adorno's statement seems to make a general
claim about the inappropriateness of writing poetry "as usual" after
the metaphysical break occasioned by Auschwitz, his utterance has
often been read as if he had written: "To write a poem about
Auschwitz is barbaric." Adorno's own clarifications support both
parsings. The power of imaginative creation, he suggests, is
overwhelmed by the magnitude of the atrocities; the most compelling
and legitimate writings about such evil will necessarily remain
nonfictional, eyewitness accounts. Efforts to grasp the Holocaust with
such a delicate and tremulous instrument as poetry-here associated,
by Adorno's own amplifications, with the language of lyric-will
produce not simply pale but grotesque results. Such efforts will
inevitably result in melodrama or sentimentality: "Through the
aesthetic principle of stylization... an unimaginable fate still seems
as if it had some meaning; it becomes transfigured, with something of
the horror removed.'
' 2
Historians Saul Friedlander and Berel Lang, among others, have
followed Adorno's lead. As "the obligation to bear witness and
record this past seems even more compelling"'3 given the per-
petrators' attempts to mask and erase their crimes of genocide,
fictional creations disturb and confuse this special imperative of
testimony. Though creative or figurative representations of the
Holocaust cannot be dismissed as necessarily distorted or banalized,
such fictionalizing can be seen as objectionable for several reasons.
First, fictionalizing the Holocaust may inadvertently play into the
hands of "revisionists" who would deny the existence of the death
camps. This concern animated the controversy that surrounded the
publication of Thomas Keneally's Schindler's List as a work of fiction,
and the debates provoked by Joanna Siedlacka's recent claims that
the story of survival told in Jerzy Kosinski's novel The Painted Bird
was, in fact, "invented."' 4  Second, and more critically, figurative
representations tend to aestheticize genocide by subjecting actual
horrors to the voyeuristic impulses of the literary imagination.15 The
value of an artistic work about the Nazi genocide must be measured,
then, in terms of its utility in advancing the goals of responsible
11. Theodor Adomo, "Engagement," in Gesammelte Schriften, ed. Rolf Tiedmann
(Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1974), 420; also in Negative Dialectics, ed. E. B. Ashton (New York:
Seabury, 1973), 360.
12. Adorno, "Engagement," in Gesammete Schriften, 422; also in Negative Dialectics, 362.
See also GUnther Grass, Schreiben nach Auschwitz (Frankfurt: Luchterhand, 1990).
13. Saul Friedlander, introduction to Probing the Limits of Representation, 3.
14. See James Park Sloan, "Kosinski's War," The New Yorker, 10 October 1994, 46.
15. See Saul Friedlander, Reflections of Nazism: An Essay on Ksch and Death (New York:
Harper & Row, 1984).
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memoryl--memory which continues to highlight the unprecedented
evil of the Holocaust.
Not surprisingly, this absence of "precedent" has created problems
for legal as well as historical and fictional discourses. The Nuremberg
Trial chronicled the difficult and at times labored efforts of the chief
prosecutor for the Allies, Supreme Court Justice Robert Jackson, to
cast the extreme outrages of the Holocaust as "lawless usurpations,"
justiciable under a flimsy body of international law. In Jackson's
strategically juridical telling, the Final Solution is portrayed as an
expedient of "aggressive war," the chief crime for which he believed
the Nazi leadership could and should be held responsible under
existing treaties and law.17 Hannah Arendt's Eichmann in Jerusalem
also reveals the strenuous and, in Arendt's view, misguided attempts
of the law to render the Holocaust judicially manageable by creating
a narrative of extreme human malignancy, a story that failed to
perceive the deeper, more sinister lesson of the Holocaust: that a vast
apparatus of death could be administered by a group of un-
imaginative, craven, but not particularly cruel, bureaucrats. 8 But
even if scholars have faulted attempts to represent the Holocaust
juridically, the law continues to be used to safeguard the historical
truth of the Holocaust against fiction.
The most compelling examples of this phenomenon have been
attempts to criminalize denials of the Holocaust. While recent
American scholarship has explored the idea of making Holocaust
denial actionable as a form of hate speech, First Amendment
jurisprudence continues to restrict the opportunities for legal control
of "revisionist" arguments. An interesting case arose in California
in 1985 when Mel Mermelstein, an Auschwitz survivor, sued the
Institute for Historical Review, a revisionist "think tank," for its
failure to honor a pledge to pay $50,000 to anyone who could prove
that gassings took place at Auschwitz. The case, however, was settled
before trial when the Institute agreed to pay the promised sum, along
with an additional $100,000, for the pain and suffering caused by the
16. The term "responsible memory" is meant to suggest a historical representation of the
past. For a discussion of the tensions between memory more generally conceived and history,
see Pierre iora, "Between Memory and History: Les Lieux de Mdmoire," Representations 26
(Spring 1989): 2-25.
17. See Robert H. Jackson's opening statement in Proceedings of the Trial of the Major War
Criminals before the International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg: Secretariat of the International
Military Tribunal, 1947), 2: 98-155.
18. See Hannah Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil (New
York: Viking, 1963).
19. See Gerald Tishler et al., "Freedom of Speech and Holocaust Denial," Cardozo Law
Review 8 (1987): 559-94. For a more general discussion of recent legal-scholarly attempts to
control hate speech, see Lawrence Douglas, "The Force of Words: Fish, Matsuda, MacKinnon,
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revoked offer.' Because Mermelstein's lawyers presented the case
as a breach of contract, the court was not confronted with First
Amendment issues.
21
A similar yet more complicated case is the 1985 trial of Ernst
Zuindel, a German-born Canadian citizen, who was accused of
publishing Holocaust denials. Ztindel, who had earned a small
fortune in Canada as a photograph retoucher22 had arranged for the
publication of Did Six Million Really Die?, a pamphlet that alleged
the Holocaust was a Zionist hoax. After a trial that turned into a
media circus (Ztindel would arrive at court dressed in a flak jacket
and hard hat emblazoned with the words "Freedom of Speech"), the
defendant was found guilty of violating a little-used portion of the
Canadian Criminal Code prohibiting the publication of false
statements "likely to cause injury or mischief to a public good."'  As
the case required the Crown to show that Ziindel's denials of the
Holocaust were in fact "false," the Canadian trial court found itself
functioning as a tribunal burdened with determining the truth of the
Holocaust according to legal conventions of proof and evidence, a
circumstance which, as we shall see later in this Essay, yielded
provocative, if not grotesque, results.
In contrast, two constitutional courts in the Federal Republic of
Germany have held that the Holocaust is offenkiindig-that is, an
incontestable and incontrovertible fact that can be taken for granted
by courts in legal actions against those who deny it.' Indeed,
Holocaust denials were specifically made a crime under a law passed
by the Federal Republic of Germany in 1985 to staunch the rise of
rightist and neo-Nazi disputations of the death camps.' Although
20. New York Times, 25 July 1985, A12.
21. Many of the court documents associated with the suit are reproduced in Mel Mermel-
stein's memoir, Not by Bread Alone (Huntington Beach, CA: Auschwitz Study Foundation,
1993).
22. His work had appeared in many of Canada's leading magazines, and twice he had
received awards from The Art Directors' Club of Toronto. See Manuel Prustchi, "The Zttndel
Affair," in Antisemitism in Canada: History and Interpretation, ed. Alan Davies (Waterloo,
Ontario: Wilfred Laurier University Press, 1992), 255.
23. R.S.C. ch. C-34, § 177 (1st Supp. 1970) (Can.). The statute provides that "every one who
willfully publishes a statement, tale or news that he knows is false and that causes or is likely
to cause injury or mischief to a public interest is guilty of an indictable offence and is liable to
imprisonment for two years."
24. See Tishler et al., "Freedom of Speech and Holocaust Denial," 563. Though the
Mermelstein case in California never reached trial, the judge also treated the Holocaust as
indisputable historical fact, accepting the plaintiff's preliminary motion to take judicial notice
of the Nazi killings. German courts, however, have taken such judicial notice even in criminal
prosecutions (the Mermelstein case involved a civil suit), a move which the Canadian courts
were reluctant to make in the Ztandel case.
25. For a useful history and analysis of the law, see Eric Stein, "History Against Speech: The
New German Law Against the 'Auschwitz'-and Other-Lies'," Michigan Law Review 85
(1986): 277-324.
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the "Auschwitz-lie" law raises interesting constitutional issues, more
compelling is the proposition that the law can and must be enlisted
for the purpose of preserving a singular historical truth. In a
postmodern world in which there are, to quote Nietzsche, "no facts,
but only interpretations," the circumstance of the Holocaust is given
special treatment. Removed from the contentious world of historical
debate and interpretation, the Holocaust has been granted foun-
dational status over all other historical propositions. To deny this
particular fact is not simply to commit a historical error but also to
commit a legal wrong.
There is, perhaps, something odd or ironic in the idea that the sole
foundational truth protected by the legal/coercive apparatus of the
German state should be the fact of the state's own criminal past and
lawlessness. Derrida, following the lead of Weber and Benjamin, has
detailed the complex ways that states buttress their claims to
legitimacy through acts of forgetting-rituals of erasure that obscure
any connection to the state's foundational moment, inevitably a time
of violent, lawless instantiation.' In contrast, the German Federal
Republic attempts to redeem its claims of legitimacy through acts of
coerced remembering, in which the history of past crimes remains
ever present, and in which the law serves as the muscle of memory.
The law, then, claims the right to demand that no one deny its
monstrous past.27 By criminalizing the Auschwitz-lie, the state
boldly enlists the law to protect history against fiction.'
26. Jacques Derrida, "Force of Law: The 'Mystical Foundation of Authority,"' in
Deconstruction and the Possibility of Justice, ed. Drucilla Cornell et al. (New York: Routledge,
1992), 3-64. See also Robert W. Gordon, "Undoing Historical Injustice," in Justice and Injustice
in Law and Legal Theory, ed. Austin Sarat and Thomas R. Kearns (Ann Arbor: University of
Michigan Press, forthcoming).
27. The Auschwitz-lie law has stimulated considerable controversy in academic circles. Some
German historians have defended the idea of legal enforcement of historical fact in this
particular case, as it ensures judicial notice of the unique evil of the Holocaust. Other historians,
specifically those associated with the Historikerstreit (historian's debate) of the last decade, have
attacked the law for precisely the same reason. Without denying the Holocaust outright, Ernst
Nolte, to take one prominent example, has attempted to assimilate the genocide against the Jews
into a larger, more conventional narrative of historical atrocity. In his controversial work, The
European Civil War, 1917-1945 (Der europaische Bargerkrieg, 1917-1945 (Berlin: Propylaen
Verlag, 1987)), Nolte tries to demonstrate that Nazi genocide did indeed have precedents,
specifically in Stalin's gulag. Perhaps not surprisingly, Nolte has attacked the Auschwitz-lie law
not because it insists upon the fact of the Holocaust (the killings), but because it implicitly
supports-by its exclusive nature-a particular reading of these facts (the "unprecedented
horror"). Letter from Professor Dr. Ernst Nolte, in "Correspondence on the 'Auschwitz Lie,"'
Michigan Law Review 87 (1989): 1026-32, 1029.
28. France and Austria have recently passed similar laws criminalizing Holocaust denial.
The French law (J.O. 90-615 (July 13, 1990)) makes it a crime for anyone to contest "the
existence of one or several crimes against humanity as defined in Article 6 of the Charter of the
International Military Tribunal...." Article 6 of the Charter of the War Crimes Tribunal at
Nuremberg defined crimes against humanity as "murder, extermination, enslavement, starvation
or deportation and other inhumane acts committed against any civilian population, before or
during the war ...." Ironically, however, the French prosecution, which was responsible for
7
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It is perhaps tendentious to conflate fictional representations of the
Holocaust with the arguments of those who would claim the
Holocaust is itself the stuff of fiction. Moreover, I do not mean to
support the arguments that have been made against imaginative
literature as a means of registering and preserving history. Indeed, a
powerful case could be made, Adorno's arguments notwithstanding,
that the. horrors of the Holocaust are most vividly captured in the
poetry of figures such as Paul Celan.29 Yet one can readily concede
the representational opportunities available to "nonliteral" discourses
without abandoning the basic idea that imaginative accounts of the
Holocaust bear an additional burden of justification. How, then, does
a work of imaginative literature attempt to rebut this presumption
against fictional representations of the Holocaust?
This question is addressed in an exemplary form by Begley's
Wartime Lies.30 Based upon the author's own experiences during the
Nazi occupation of Poland, the novel invites two related queries:
First, in light of legitimate concerns about fictionalizing the historical
record, how does a text drawn from the autobiographical facts of its
author's life understand its own status as a novel? Second, in light of
the genre's relaxed fidelity to history, how does the novel answer the
argument, presented in the most hyperbolic form in the "revisionist"
writings of Zutndel, that the story of the Holocaust is entirely
the presentation of the evidence of crimes against humanity at the Nuremberg Trial for the
Major War Criminals, never mentioned the murder of the Jews. See Taylor, The Anatomy of
the Nuremberg Trials, 295-96.
The Austrian statute (BGB1 No. 148 (March 19, 1992)) makes it a crime if a person "denies,
grossly trivializes [groblich verharmlost], approves or seeks to justify the national socialist
genocide or other national socialist crimes against humanity." Though the law was passed in
1992, no one has yet litigated the meaning of such terms as "grossly trivializes." See Stephen
J. Roth, "Denial of the Holocaust: An Issue of Law," in Institute ofJewish Affairs Research
Reports 2 (1994).
29. His justly famous "Todesfuge" ("Death Fugue"), with its syntax stripped of punctuation,
presents canonical repetitions, startling juxtapositions, and violently oxymoronic metaphors
("Black milk of daybreak we drink it at evening... ."; "we shovel a grave in the air there you
won't feel too cramped"). The piece provides an astonishing example of a powerful poetic
imagination breaking with accepted idioms to express, in Lyotard's words, "what is not
presentable under the rules of knowledge." "Todesfuge," in Poems of Paul Celan, ed. and trans.
Michael Hamburger (New York: Persea, 1989), 60-63.
30. Wartime Lies, Begley's first novel, was published in 1991 when Begley was fifty-seven.
Before that time Begley was best known for his distinguished career in the law. As a partner
in the firm of Debevoise & Plimpton, Begley had risen to the top of his field of international
law, an area he once described as "the most amusing form of practice." Elizabeth Devereaux,
"Interview with Louis Begley," Publisher's Weekly, 2 May 1994,278. Since Wartime Lies, he has
published two further novels, The Man Who Was Late, a consideration of the psychic damage
left upon a survivor, and As Max Saw It, a probing examination of a relationship between two
men, one of whom is dying of an AIDS-like disease. His literary projects notwithstanding, he
continues to practice law energetically. He provides, then, a particularly provocative example
of an attorney-author who has achieved remarkable success in both spheres of his work. If, as
I will argue, Wartime Lies implicitly instructs the reader in the exclusions of legal discourse, then
it must not be mere coincidence that such instruction should issue from an author with such an
intimate understanding of the language of the law.
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fictional? My answers to these questions will suggest, I hope, not only
how Wartime Lies justifies itself as a work of fiction, but also how the
text implicitly draws attention to the exclusions and distortions of
historical and juridical discourses that claim a special privilege in
representing and safeguarding the facts of the Holocaust.
II. HISTORY AS FICTION, OR FICTION AS HISTORY?
At first glance, Wartime Lies seems to rebel against its own fictional
status; it reads, after all, less like a novel than a history, and less like
a history than a chronicle. If a "chronicle" merely recites undigested
historical detail, while "history" operates through principles of
exclusion and schemes of emplotment, then many of the details
presented in Wartime Lies seem to belong to the former genre of
historical telling. To take a notable example from early in the novel,
the first-person narrator, Maciek, tells how his aunt Tania, who will
emerge as the most arresting figure in the story, came to live with his
family. He does so by describing the death of Maciek's uncle, Tania's
brother:
On one of his [horseback-riding] expeditions, he was surprised by
a violent thunderstorm. He dismounted, took refuge under a
tree, and, holding his horse by the reins, tried to calm him by
stroking and kissing his nostrils. Lightening struck very close.
The horse panicked and bit my uncle repeatedly on the face.
The scars were very ugly. The girl [the uncle's love] seemed
more distant; my uncle didn't know whether to blame distractions
of university life or revulsion. Which reason was worse? ...
[B]efore the fall semester was over, he went one afternoon to the
stable and killed his horse and himself with two rounds of shot.
So it happened that Tania came to live with us, to make a
home for my father and to bring me up.31
The story is remarkable, not least of all because the uncle never again
receives mention in the book. As a piece of reportage, the story
displays certain formal features of historical writing: The narrator for
the most part tells the story from the outside, and his only moment
of access to a character's thoughts issues in an example of un-
decidability ("Which reason was worse?"). Yet the story fails as an
instance of historical writing for the simple reason that it never
clarifies the very point it is enlisted to explain: how the aunt came to
live with Maciek's family. Was she grief-stricken and, as a conse-
quence, moved into the narrator's household? The text creates the
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aunt's move, yet the connection is never made clear. The passage
subtly imputes a causal link between discrete events that in the boy's
memory may simply have followed each other temporally.
The ambiguities of this passage notwithstanding, it clearly does not
read as fiction. The very oddity of the details (the "stroking and
kissing" of the horse's nostrils), and the Gothic Fuselian quality of the
injuries (bitten "repeatedly" after a flash of lightning) might seem to
mark the story as invented, but the fact that the voice of fabulative
detail does not as a general matter characterize the texture of the
writing, and the fact that neither the uncle's suicide nor the inflicted
injuries foreshadow events in the rest of the text, create a structural
imbalance that one would not admit into a fictive piece. If anything,
the specificity and idiosyncracy of the details function as a "reality
effect," a stretch of discourse that supports the facticity of the narra-
tive.32 By this I do not mean to suggest that the very oddity of the
story belies any suggestion that Begley might have fabricated it; I
mean simply to claim that regardless of the ultimate truthfulness of
the story, it functions as a "rhetoric of fact"; it serves to convince the
reader that the narrative is principally a matter of historical truth
rather than fictional creation.3
Later in the "novel" the narrator tells the story of his illness:
My liver hurt and I was feverish. It was obvious to Tania that I
had jaundice, like my grandmother just before the end. .....
Summoning a doctor was excluded; he would want to examine
me, he might see my penis. ... This time Tania was worried.
She was not sure how [one] cured jaundice. Apparently, Pan
Wladek was worried too. He came to our room and said, I can
recommend a doctor you can trust in every way; please let him
examine the child, Pani need not be afraid. Tania agreed. The
diet and pills the doctor prescribed worked rapidly. I was able
to resume lessons and even to go out to meet my grandfather.'
Here again the novel reads less as fiction than as history, and less as
history than as chronicle. A dramatic situation is sketched with an
economy of means: the boy has fallen ill with the disease that has
already claimed his grandmother, yet summoning a doctor is consid-
ered too dangerous as the boy's circumcised penis would reveal him
to be a Jew. Further, his aunt, preternaturally resourceful in most
situations, is at a loss when it comes to the treatment of jaundice.
32. Kermode has identified the same effect in the case of the Gospels. See Frank Kermode,
The Genesis of Secrecy (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979), 101-23.
33. For an excellent discussion of the uses of the "rhetoric of fact" in novelistic represen-
tations of the Holocaust, see James E. Young, Writing and Rewriting the Holocaust
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990), 51-63.
34. Begley, 123.
10
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities, Vol. 7, Iss. 2 [1995], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjlh/vol7/iss2/4
Douglas
Suddenly, however, the drama is resolved in the very paragraph in
which it is introduced: a neighbor knows a trustworthy doctor who
quickly cures the child. The reader approaches the following pages
with the suspenseful expectation that the good doctor would be less
trustworthy than originally believed, which would catapult the family
once again into a situation of peril. But the next few pages pass
without incident, and soon one stops thinking of either the jaundice
or the doctor-except to consider why they were ever mentioned in
the first place.
It is clear enough that a writer of fiction would not ordinarily
introduce such a potentially dramatic situation only to resolve it in so
sudden and unsatisfying a fashion. The incident serves, then, not to
push the narrative imaginatively forward; to the contrary, it creates
the suggestion that fidelity to an undigested historical record rather
than submission to the imperatives of fiction is responsible for the
shape of the text. The relative flatness of the writing, as well as the
absence of any effort on the narrator's part to create a causal
connection between the event and what follows in his story, support
the notion that the jaundice incident functions as pure chronicle-a
simple recitation of fact that serves no larger principles of narrative
organization. By eschewing principles of fictional organization and
relying upon a rhetoric of fact, the novel does not seem to rebut the
presumption against fictional representations of the Holocaust as
much as it ostensibly surrenders to the force of the critique. Indeed,
if the text is so concerned with passing itself off as the truth that it
bears many of the rhetorical and structural trappings of historical
discourse, then why is the narrative presented as a work of fiction?
Yet as we shall see, the text's own ambivalence toward its status as a
novel describes less a fault with the work than it indicates a necessary
and brilliant solution to the problems of representing the narrator's
remarkable story of survival.
III. THE LIMITS OF INVENTION AND MEMORY:
THE SURVIVOR AS LIAR
The contours of the story are suggested by the title, Wartime Lies.
The title itself is discomfiting, creating inevitable associations with the
claims of those who would offer a complete denial of the Nazis'
campaign of genocide. More critically, the title resonates with what
we have already observed, for the text's central lie seems to be
contained in its pretensions to historical truth. It calls itself a work
of the imagination at the same time that it rhetorically passes itself off
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Yet the problem of "passing oneself off" describes not merely the
novel's ambivalent participation in its genre, but also the very content
of the narrative. For on the most general level, the novel tells the
story of how Maciek and Tania survive the wartime years in Poland
by passing themselves off as non-Jews. The story at the beginning is
quite conventional, assuming the form of continuity and disruption.
The first chapter establishes the quotidian routine of a Jewish family
of some prominence in a town of middling size. This routine is
vulnerable from the outset: the opening sentence portentously informs
that "I was born a few months after the burning of the Reichstag in
T., a town of about forty thousand in a part of Poland that before the
Great War had belonged to the Austro-Hungarian Empire."35 At
once, the text links the personal development of the little boy with
larger, inexorable political events that will define, as much as any
parent, his character. The reference to the Reichstag fire stands in
the place of an explicit date of birth; the novel thus presupposes a
bare familiarity with history to appreciate the chronology of the
unfolding narrative. The use of the letter "T." to designate the town
again serves as a reality effect, for it suggests that discretion counsels
anonymity. Finally, the mention of the Austro-Hungarian empire
situates the story historically as well as geographically.
Following a pattern set in other works of Holocaust literature such
as Elie Wiesel's Night36 and Jiri Weil's Life with a Star,37 the nar-
rative quickly turns into a story of disruption. When the Germans
invade, Maciek's father, a doctor, must flee with escaping Soviet
troops back to Russia; and the boy, whose mother died during his
birth, remains in the care of his aunt. Yet this swift transformation
of domestic routine registers with the boy less through the disap-
pearance of the father than through the loss of his beloved Polish
maid, who is bluntly told by her own father that "it was high time his
child stopped wiping the rear end of a little Jew bastard" and rid
herself of the "smell of Jew."38 From this moment on, the family's
plight becomes progressively more desperate, although the novel
assumes familiarity with, rather than portrays, the details of the
rapidly escalating persecution of the Polish Jewish population. Nazi
roundups and SS "actions" are named but not shown. Compared with
works like Steven Spielberg's Schindler's List or Art Spiegelman's
Maus, the novel is less concerned with supplying visual or discursive
knowledge of these events, and more reliant upon the reader's
35. Ibid., 7.
36. Elie Weisel, Night (New York: Hill & Wang, 1960).
37. Jiri Weil, Life with a Star (London: Collins, 1989).
38. Ibid., 33.
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familiarity with the timetable of the "Final Solution" for the force of
its drama.
The rest of the novel chronicles Maciek and Tania's "lies," the
deceits they must call upon in order to keep the truth of their
identities concealed. The text reveals the costs of these duplicities
with great subtlety, as Maciek and Tania become transformed and
defined by the very ruses they enlist to protect themselves. The
beginning of the story suggests this transformation when, soon after
the Nazis occupy the town, the boy's grandfather counsels him to
"watch very carefully and try to understand as much as possible..
•.,39 The act of witnessing is severed from the child's innocent
curiosity, as witnessing becomes a tool of survival-and subterfuge.
Later Maciek and Tania obtain, through the aunt's resourcefulness,
forged papers, and later, "something really excellent, real papers and
not forgeries, for a mother and son."'  These "real fakes" complete
a transformation that has been moved along by the force of cir-
cumstance: The aunt fully assumes the role of maternal protector.
She styles her hair in an effort to resemble more closely the mother
pictured in the papers, and the two of them change their names. "In
the new papers, my name was no longer Maciek, and Tania was no
longer Tania; I was to be called Janek."41  Like the elaborate
archival scheme of the Nazis from whom they flee, the two find
themselves defined by their papers.
Their new identities take some getting used to and require more
lies. A single mother home alone with a school-age child in a rented
room would arouse suspicions, Tania realizes, so she invents a story
of the boy's ill health, a tale the two spend hours rehearsing and
perfecting: "Questions of the sort Tania and I rehearsed were to be
answered before they were asked, so that the inquisitive landlady or
fellow lodger would never begin the dreaded inquiry that might lead
to the truth."'42 Thus "mooted" by his aunt, the boy learns to
construct tutored testimony that will be freely proffered in order to
preempt difficult questions.
The aunt, moreover, demonstrates a keen insight into the formal
requirements of such stories:
One had to talk, one could not always talk about books, one had
to be ready to talk about oneself. Which self?. The issue was the
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be consistent-more consistent, according to Tania, than the
truth.43
This theory of lying indirectly explains the function that incidents such
as the uncle's suicide and the jaundice play in the narrative. In a
discursive world that details the erosion of the distinction between
"inventiveness and memory" in the life of a young boy, such incidents
flag themselves as "the truth," precisely because they lack the
consistency that one demands from fictional creations.
The adoption of their new fictional identities is completed by
"Janek's" initiation into Catholicism. Up to this point the narrative
has subtly chronicled the twosome's growing distance from their
doomed kinspeople and their religion. They escape an early SS
"action" through a tip-off which they fail to share with their neigh-
bors. Later, during the first autumn of their "hiding," the aunt
comments that it "probably was the period of Jewish holidays; it was
odd not to know on what day they began."'  When they find their
first garret in Warsaw, they exterminate the bedbugs with "chemical
agents," a success that "paralleled that of the Reich."'45 Later,
Maciek comes to watch German suppression of the Ghetto uprising
from a rooftop in the company of other tenants who enjoy the
unobstructed view of the "fireworks."' The boy bears witness to the
destruction of Polish Jewry as an outsider looking in, and indeed his
contact with the death camps is harrowing precisely because it
remains circumstantial.
Yet the lies cause more than an alienation from their fellow Jews;
slowly, they begin to leave their mark upon the relationship between
Maciek and Tania. Toward the end of his story, the narrator tells of
an incident in which he finds himself lying-this time to Tania herself.
Their flight from Warsaw lands them in a farming village where a
family of peasants permits Maciek to work their field and enlists
Tania into its bootlegging operation. Maciek, encouraged by a local
boy, spends a day smoking cheap cigarettes, precipitating a new
medical crisis.
When it was time to drive the cows home, I was desperately sick.
I rubbed my face and hands with cow dung to mask the smell of
tobacco; the stench of vomit complemented my efforts. The
vomiting was followed by diarrhea that continued through the
night and into the next day. I was green; my teeth chattered; I
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come down with typhoid fever, I miraculously recovered.
Nothing could induce me to reveal to her the true nature of my
illness.
4
It is a critical moment in the text: The techniques of subterfuge and
dissembling that Maciek has dutifully learned from his aunt are now
turned against her. The narrator himself recognizes the importance
of the incident, and at this point the novel ceases to read as a story
of survival and witnessing, and begins to assume the qualities of a
confession, as the narrator gropes to make his behavior comprehen-
sible to both his reader and himself Indeed, the transgression is
never admitted to the aunt; it is only revealed to the reader, who now
learns that the true wrong was not the smoking but the failure to
confess the original minor misdeed. The narrator offers various
hypotheses of "what held me back with such force from confessing
and made me prefer to increase her suffering as well as my own," and
finally, rather laconically, concludes: "I was chained to the habit of
lying, and I no longer believed that weakness or foolishness or
mistakes could be forgiven by Tania or me. '
I was chained to the habit of lying: The story has come full circle.
The habit of lying has become such a part of the boy's being that he
now uses it to deceive the one person in the world who claims to
know who he really is. Yet more provocatively, the narrator's very
explanation of his own behavior is itself, I believe, unreliable. The
literature of confession offers many fascinating examples of failed
efforts to explain the transgressive behavior of the author/confessor.
Consider two of the most famous instances of confession in Western
literature: Rousseau's attempt to explain why he accused the young
maid of stealing the yellow ribbon that in fact he had stolen to
present to her as a gift, and Augustine's attempt to make clear why
he plundered the pears from his neighbor's trees. 49 Both instances
remain notable not because they brilliantly lay bare the inner psyche
and tangled motives of the respective confessors, but rather because
they both can be understood as moments of failed explanation.
Rousseau's and Augustine's confessions conspicuously fail to make
sense of the very incidents that are presented in their texts as being
responsible for the impulse to write. Their discursive tool, the
47. Ibid., 167.
48. Ibid., 171.
49. See Paul de Man, Allegories of Reading (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979), 278-
301. See also J. M. Coetzee, "Confession and Double Thoughts: Tolstoy, Rousseau,
Dostoevsky," in Doubling the Point: Essays and Interviews, ed. David Attwell (Cambridge:
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confession, cannot make comprehensible the very behaviors it is
meant to lay bare.
But if confessional literature offers reasons for a reader to treat a
confessor's explanation of transgression with some wariness, Maciek's
confession deserves special circumspection. For one thing, it bears the
very properties of a lie as defined by Tania. By resolving all narrative
ambiguity, by tidily fitting it into a story about how one can become
"chained to the habit of lying," the confession possesses precisely that
quality of heightened consistency that the aunt has already claimed
distinguishes the fictional from the true.
Moreover, the narrator seems oblivious to other, more plausible
explanations of his behavior. While he speculates that he no longer
believes that weakness and mistakes would be tolerated by Tania, he
overlooks the ways in which his aunt submits him to a regimen of
total watchfulness that leaves no aspects of his behavior free from
surveillance.
[S]he was equally insistent on my controlling myself and being
controlled by her at times when I thought it didn't matter, when
we were alone. It may be that she thought I needed to be in
constant training. More likely, it was because of the effort she
was making never to lose the complete hold she had on herself
and because we were constantly together. Already in T.,... we
slept in the same room .... [M]y nakedness and my bowel and
bladder movements continued to be subject to question, inspec-
tion and comment.'
The distinction between Maciek's and Tania's public life of duplicity
and their private existence thus vanishes under his aunt's total and
exhausting vigilance. Not only do the two literally "lie together,"5
the boy's life in hiding begins to resemble, through his aunt's exacting
disciplines, the life of a camp inmate. Yet the possibility that his lying
to his aunt about his smoking-induced sickness is born of some deeper
psychology of rebellion, marking an attempt to define a space free
from her scrutiny and probing, apparently never occurs to the
narrator. Nor does the narrator consider the interesting parallels
between his lies to Tania and his earlier traumas, which have brought
him to consider the confessional itself as a form of lying.
Earlier in the narrative, Tania's insistence that Maciek receive, as
part of their scheme of dissembling, a religious education in
Catholicism triggers in the boy a crisis not simply of faith but also of
50. Begley, 165.
51. Janet Malcolm, "A Matter of Life and Death," The New York Review of Books, 13 June
1991, 17.
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conscience. As he becomes initiated into the Catholic theory of sin,
the boy reflects:
Bearing false witness was forbidden; serious lying and hypocrisy
were the same as bearing false witness; I was a liar and hypo-
crite every day; I was mired in mortal sin on that account alone
52
The identification of bearing false witness with lying and hypocrisy
recapitulates the text's basic crisis of representation; it claims to offer
credible eyewitness testimony at the same time that the witness
portrays himself as a liar. This crisis is exacerbated in the boy's mind
by the church's sacraments:
The day of my first Communion came. Tania offered to give me
breakfast on the sly in our room, but I refused. I wanted to be
clean inside, just as Father P had directed.... The priest blessed
me.... I did it all carefully and slowly, and even though I knew
I remained in the state of mortal sin, I tried to do nothing, until
I knelt to receive the wafer, that would add to the weight of the
judgment hanging over me.53
Here the boy's alienation from his religion is complete, as the very
rituals meant to hide his Jewishness become internal to his sense of
self. Yet the former identity continues to leave its traces in the form
of guilt. Though he tries to be "clean inside," the very effort to pass
himself off as something he is not marks him as corrupt. The rituals
that are meant to enfold the pious into the community of belief,
communion and confession, simply become new forms of torment.
Confession is forever deferred, as the act that invites a coming
"clean" becomes an occasion for greater duplicities. The act of
confessing thus becomes impossible, a never-ending ritual of lying and
torment.
His aunt tries to ease his crisis of conscience through instrumental
thinking. "Her reasoning never varied: You have to do it, it's not
your fault, if Jesus Christ allows these things to happen it is the fault
of Jesus Christ, not your fault. ' While the aunt's words may offer
a theologically or legally sound justification for perjury under the
circumstances, the failure of her argument to convince the boy is
suggested indirectly through a minor though morbid incident. The
narrator briefly turns his story away from Maciek's religious ordeal to
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One day, Tania came from the market with pork she had gotten
at a decent price, probably because it was an inferior cut ....
The meat had an odd taste; it was sweet .... The next day he [a
fellow boarder] told her in secret there was no doubt we had
eaten man.55
Revolting as the story is in its concrete detail, its deeper associations
powerfully suggest Maciek's abject state of being. The intended
purchase, pork, is a proscribed meat of the Jewish faith. Yet the act
of inadvertent cannibalism also conjures the boy's duplicitous commu-
nion. The cannibalism incident thus reads less as a detail of the
horrors of war than as an instance of divine punishment for multiple
sacrileges-for violating the dietary proscriptions of his "true" religion
and for profaning the host of his fictional faith.
The narrator's failure to make these connections represents more
than a simple lack of insight into his own feelings and motivations.
At this critical moment of self-revelation, the narrator's understanding
of himself fails for the simple reason that there is no stable self left to
reveal. The alienation is complete: just as he has lost touch with his
people, faith, and protecting "mother," he has also lost the capacity
to probe his own inwardness. The confession cannot deliver on the
promise of cleansing and of return to conditions of authentic being
because there is no "authentic" being left. In this regard, Wartime
Lies differs importantly from other pieces of Holocaust writing such
as Tadeusz Borowski's This Way for the Gas, Ladies and
Gentlemen56 or Arnost Lustig's Darkness Casts No Shadow,57 for
the emptying of self is not caused by contact with horrors so extreme
that one's normative and psychic universe is laid to waste. In
Wartime Lies, Maciek and Tania protect themselves through lies that
become constitutive of their identity, displacing the very "self" they
were meant to protect.
The novel's conclusion-"Tania and I were saved"-thus reads as
a denouement. This is suggested by the shift in narrative voice: the
last episode of Maciek's story is told in the third person, a voice of
ironical, not impersonal, narration. This final speaker refers to his
own "self' and circumstances from the position of an observer. The
boy-narrator has simply vanished:
And is Maciek's name again Maciek? Has the unmentionable
Jewish name been resumed? Certainly not; the visor was not
55. Ibid., 118.
56. Tadeusz Borowski, This Way for the Gas, Ladies and Gentlemen (New York: Penguin
Books, 1989)
57. Arnost Lustig, Darkness Casts No Shadow (Washington: Inscape, 1976).
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lifted in Kielce; it will not be lifted in Cracow. Maciek has new
Aryan pagers and a new Polish surname with not a whiff of the
Jew in it.
The last vestige of his Judaism is the body that will not lie: "Yes,
Maciek's penis is still his old penis, different from the others, but he
has learned that one can avoid urinating in public places or otherwise
displaying that telltale member."59 While the practice of offering
testimony is etymologically derived from the ancient Hebrew practice
of swearing by one's testicles, now the male anatomy registers the
continuing history of deceit.
This detached voice sketches Maciek's coming adulthood in broad
strokes. The aunt moves away; the father, who survived the war
through his own lies, remarries and brings the family to America.
And where is Maciek now? In the novel's final paragraph, we are
told:
A man who bears one of the names Maciek used has replaced
him. Is there much Maciek in that man? No: Maciek was a
child, and our man has no childhood that he can bear to
remember; he has had to invent one.' °
The last sentence is poignant yet confusing: Was Maciek himself an
invention? Earlier, when the aunt demands a consistency to their lies
that she would not demand of the truth, the narrator comments, "the
issue was the limit of one's inventiveness and memory."61 Now, in
the last sentences of the text, the tension between invention and
memory resurfaces, though the "issue" is not the limits of the
narrator's power to lie as a means to survive the present, but his need
to fictionalize in order to endure the past. In this final paragraph, the
reader is returned to the novel's prologue, when the narrator "thinks
on the story of the child .... For the sake of an old song, he calls the
child Maciek." 62 Thus the reader is reminded that "Maciek," the
very name that has undergone multiple changes, the signifier that has
lost its signified, was itself all along, a fiction.
IV. THE TESTIMONY OF THE LIAR/SURVIVOR
But if the narrator of Wartimes Lies must tell his story in the idiom
of fiction because he "cannot bear" to tell his story truthfully, what
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fiction, and if our witness portrays himself as a compulsive liar, how
can we speak of a stable historical record? The issue of the narrator's
unreliability, his deconstruction of the boundary between memory and
invention, thus returns us to our point of departure: the rival claims
of fictional and juridical discourses attempting to secure the history of
an event that resists representation.
In the case of the law, the trial serves as the primary tool for
securing a truthful picture of an historical event. Indeed, as one
commentator has observed, "we have no better way to discover the
historical truth underlying a case than the trial process itself."'
Despite the elaborate evidentiary norms associated with this process,
the trial in Anglo-American jurisprudence is governed by a relatively
simple proposition: that facts be proved by firsthand testimony and
that knowledge be produced by direct observation.' This privileging
of testimony, however, does not indicate a juridical faith in the
veracity of the spoken word; quite to the contrary, Anglo-American
jurisprudence attempts to -control the specter of mendacious or
mistaken testimony through the rigors of adversarial confrontation.65
The medieval canonical stricture of testis unus, testis nullus (one
witness, no witness), though formally abandoned in modern rules of
evidence, suggests an attitude that continues to inform contemporary
jurisprudence, one that enfolds all testimony in suspicion.
The law's enduring epistemological wariness both focuses acute
attention upon human recital-viva voce-as the foundational method
of proof and generates intricate rules that control the court's capacity
to hear and accept secondhand testimonial reports.' To take a
simple example from Wartime Lies, when Tania embarks on a risky
trip to a nearby village to learn what has become of Maciek's
grandfather, she meets a peasant who "laughed and said she had
come too late.... [T]he Germans came last week and shot him right
against the barn wall."'67 Later that night, she tearfully awakens
Maciek and tells him the dreadful news. Though the reader accepts
the story with only minor reservations-how could Tania be sure that
the man the peasant described was, in fact, her father?-as a juridical
matter, the entire story, as told by Maciek, would be inadmissible as
proof of the grandfather's murder. Indeed, in this case the hearsay is
63. H. Richard Uviller, "Credence, Character, and the Rules of Evidence: Seeing Through
the Liar's Tale," Duke Law Journal 42 (1993): 776-839, 777.
64. See Edward W. Cleary, ed., McCormick on Evidence, 3rd ed. (St. Paul: West Publishing,
1989), 23-25.
65. See Carlo Ginzburg, "Just One Witness," in Friedlander, Probing the Limits of
Representation, 82-96. See also Carlo Ginzburg, "Checking the Evidence: The Historian and the
Judge," Crtical Inquiry 18 (Autumn 1991): 79-92.
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doubled, as Maciek is repeating a story related to his aunt. The
juridically relevant witness, the Polish peasant, would remain
unavailable to the court and thus so too would the small story of
another Jew lost in the Holocaust.
More troublingly, adversarial jurisprudence's insistence upon
eyewitness testimony has the further consequence of rendering many
Holocaust narratives either unavailable to a trial or available only
through evidentiary loopholes. Thus in the 1987 case of Regina v.
Zundel-the appellate case spawned from the trial mentioned
earlier-the Canadian appellate tribunal had to decide whether the
testimony of an eminent Holocaust historian, Raul Hilberg, had been
improperly admitted during Ernst Ztindel's trial for injuring "a public
interest" by publishing denials of the Holocaust.' While the
appellate court conceded that Hilberg's testimony was technically
hearsay, it reasoned that it was "admissible to prove the existence of
the Holocaust."'69 Exceptions to the hearsay rule, the court noted,
generally "are based upon (a) necessity, and (b) the circumstantial
trustworthiness of the evidence to which the exception applies."70
Here the criterion of necessity was satisfied, as the question
whether the Holocaust ever occurred had to be answered by the trial
court concerned with prosecuting a professed denier. Usually, of
course, a court can simply "take judicial notice" of an accepted
historical fact; adversarial jurisprudence does not require that the
parties "prove" Napoleon's armies fought at Waterloo. In this case,
however, the appellate court reasoned that had the trial court taken
judicial notice of the Holocaust, it essentially would have relieved the
prosecution of its burden of proving guilt: "to grant the motion would
have the effect of substantially eliminating a portion of the duty
incumbent on the Crown in so far as the guilt of the accused is
concerned."71 The prosecution was thrust, then, in the odd position
of having to prove, in order to win its case, that the Holocaust
occurred, a discomfiting position to occupy in a trial meant to
demonstrate that certain statements are so beyond the pale of
legitimate dispute as to justify the imposition of a criminal sanction.
The turn to expert-that is, hearsay-testimony was necessitated, the
Court reasoned, by the unlikelihood that "living witnesses could be
obtained."
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The events sought to be proved by Dr. Hilberg's opinion
occurred more than 40 years ago, and while there are survivors
of the Nazi concentration camps, some whom were called as
witnesses, it is unlikely that living witnesses responsible for
formulating the policy of the Nazi government or carrying out
the policies in relation to the events alleged, could be ob-
tained.73
Reliance upon expert/hearsay testimony was necessitated not simply
by the failing memories of the survivors, but also by the continued
failure of the perpetrators to provide the law with a testimonial
account of their crimes.74 As Hilberg's work was based upon
"material to which ... any careful and competent historian would
resort,"75 it also satisfied the second criterion of "the circumstantial
guaranty of the trustworthiness of the evidence."
In contrast, the court concluded that a United States Army film
documenting the liberation of the Nazi concentration camps failed
under the rules of hearsay, as the nameless screenplay writer and
narrator were unavailable for cross-examination. Although the film
ostensibly produced direct visual information about the depicted
historical event, the narrative in which these images were embedded
was juridically unreliable. While the prosecution had anticipated the
hearsay problem, it believed the film would be admitted, since there
was ample precedent for the court to do so: The film had been
shown forty years before at the Nuremberg trial.76 Unfortunately for
the Ziindel prosecution, the Nuremberg trial was governed by
standards of proof intentionally relaxed to permit the display of
evidence otherwise barred by Anglo-American conventions.' When
the film was shown in the Canadian trial, the court concluded that
because the makers of the narrative were not present for adversarial
confrontation (nor had they been available at Nuremberg), their film
could not be accepted as a trustworthy depiction of the historical
event it captured. (Here, Ztindel's successful career as a photo
retoucher creates its own disconcerting resonances.) Despite the
73. Ibid.
74. While the body of literature by survivors and eyewitnesses is large, the perpetrators of
the Holocaust have remained largely silent about their deeds. This silence is broken in
Auschwitz in den Augen der SS [Auschwitz in the Eyes of the SS], ed. Jadwiga Bezwinska and
Danuta Czech (Warszawa: Verlag Interpress, 1992), a compilation of the writings of Rudolf HOP,
Pery Broad, and Johann Paul Kremer. H6O served as the commandant of Auschwitz until 1943.
Broad was a guard, and Kremer was a prison doctor who participated in "selecting" the newly
arrived for work or extermination.
75. ZUndel, 31 Canadian Criminal Cases at 148.
76. See Proceedings of the Trial of the Major War Criminals before the International Military
Tribunal, 2: 431-34.
77. See Taylor, 63-64, 147-49.
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testimonies of Hilberg and the survivors, the trial court's admission of
the army documentary, along with other procedural defects in the
original trial, led the appellate court to toss out the original convic-
tion. 8
The court's conclusion exemplifies the problems with applying
evidentiary conventions of Anglo-American jurisprudence to secure
the fact of the Holocaust. At the same time that the law intervenes
to protect history from the charge that it is mere fiction, the law
remains strangely agnostic regarding the truth of the very event it is
enlisted to defend. This highly artificial and formal restriction of
knowledge merely redoubles the law's dependence upon the in-court
witness, who functions then as the discursive medium through which
a court, trapped in its self-willed ignorance, can secure the truth of an
event. Yet it is precisely this model of the witness that only uneasily
accommodates the testimony of a Maciek. For to be trustworthy, the
witness ideally presents himself as a person of untainted character,
whose testimony is sufficiently free of contradictions, inconsistencies,
and incoherences to withstand the assault of cross-examination.79 In
this jurisprudential model, the witness identifies himself to the court
before he tells the court what he has seen. His identity, once defined
and secured, is considered anterior to, and enabling of, the act of
bearing responsible witness. By focusing upon the character of the
witness, as well as the coherence and consistency of his narrative, the
law seeks to separate truth from lies, responsible memory from self-
conscious or unwitting invention. Testimony thus functions as a proxy
for a camera, providing the court with an unoccluded window on
historical fact. Yet as the ZiIndel case makes clear, the court does not
trust the camera by itself; even the "documentary" will be subject to
78. The other defects included an improper voir dire regarding pretrial publicity and
improper jury instructions regarding the mental state of the defendant. Zandel, 31 Canadian
Criminal Cases at 124-25, 89-102. Ztlndel was retried from mid-January until early May 1988.
The judge in the second trial agreed to take judicial notice of the Holocaust, directing the jury
to accept that "the mass murder and extermination of Jews in Europe by the Nazis during the
Second World War is so notorious as not to be subject of dispute." Leonidas E. Hill, "The Trial
of Ernst Zfindel: Revisionism and Law in Canada," in Simon Wiesenthal Center Annual
(Chappaqua, N.Y.: Rossel Books, 1989), 200. Yet as Leonidas Hill has observed, the judicial
notice was restrictively defined, as the judge's "careful wording left open the question of the
number of Jews killed, the means (such as gas chambers) by which they were killed, and the role
of official government policy." Ibid. Zondel was found guilty in the second trial and sentenced
to nine months in prison. See ibid. In 1992, the Canadian Supreme Court declared un-
constitutional the section of the Criminal Code under which Ztlndel had been charged. See
Regina v. Ztlndel, 75 Canadian Criminal Cases (3d) 449 (S.C.R. 1992); see also Deborah E.
Lipstadt, Denying the Holocaust (New York: Free Press, 1993), 157-82.
79. See, for example, Annette Wievioka, "On Testimony," in Holocaust Remembrance, ed.
Geoffrey H. Hartman (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994), 23-32. See also Sara R. Horowitz, "Rethinking
Holocaust Testimony: The Making and Unmaking of the Witness," Cardozo Studies in Law and
Literature 4 (1992): 45-68; and W. Lance Bennett and Martha S. Feldman, Reconstructing Reality
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juridical doubt unless the person behind the lens can be seen and
heard in the courtroom.
The court's dependence upon the exemplary witness finds
resonance in Holocaust studies, as scholars have searched for the best
testimony to silence the hateful denials of the historical record.'
Ironically, it is Primo Levi, the very man who has been cast by
historians as the "quintessential witness,"'" who has most per-
suasively disputed the coherence of this ideal: "The worst survived,
that is the fittest: the best all died."' The consequence of this could
serve as a pr6cis for Wartime Lies: "At a distance of years one can
today definitely affirm that the history of the Lagers has been written
almost exclusively by those who, like mysel, never fathomed them to
the bottom."'83 The "privileged witnesses," Levi explains, were the
kapos and those whose luck and abilities made survival possible. Like
the nameless narrator of Begley's novel, the man whose skin is "virgin
of tattoo,"84 it was often the liars who survived to tell the truth.
This observation is not meant to demonize or cast moral aspersions
on the survivors. Nor does it suggest that the historical record
remains, as a result, "corrupt." Indeed, such a claim would merely
call into question the soundness of the ambition for a perfectly
untainted or transparent historical narrative. Instead, Levi's statement
and Begley's novel correct two equally pernicious myths surrounding
those who "lived to tell" and, in so doing, reveal how the very
conventions of the law meant to secure the truth of the Holocaust fail
to do justice to the experience of the survivors. On the one hand,
there is the tendency to subject survivors to the demeaning suspicion
that survival amid such odds could only be accomplished through
extreme acts of savagery and self-interest. As in the medieval ordeal,
innocence could be proven only by death.' On the other hand,
there is an opposite tendency to bestow upon survivors an impossible
innocence. Long before she wrote about the Eichmann trial, Hannah
Arendt noted that one of the unfortunate if inevitable consequences
of the Nuremberg trials was to confer upon the victims "an innocence
80. See, for example, Lawrence Langer, "Interpreting Survivor Testimony," in Writing and
the Holocaust, ed. Berel Lang (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1988), 26-40. See also Lawrence
Langer, Holocaust Testimonies: The Ruins of Memory (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991).
81. See Irving Howe, introduction to If Not Now, When? by Primo Levi, trans. William
Weaver (New York: Summit Books, 1982), 9.




85. See Lawrence Douglas, "Last Bus From Auschwitz," The Massachusetts Review 35
(Spring 1994): 7-23.
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that is beyond good or virtue., 86  In the face of such monstrous
"metaphysical guilt," the law inevitably foisted upon the survivors a
burdensome and unsustainable innocence.
This insight, I believe, helps us to understand better the represen-
tational ambivalence of Wartime Lies and returns us to the question
I posed earlier in this essay: Given the presumption against fic-
tionalizing the Holocaust, as well as the text's own rhetoric of fact,
how can we understand the text's status as a novel? The narrator, as
we have seen, answers this question for himself: the turn to fiction is
made inevitable by the pain of memory. Again, however, the
narrator's account of his own behavior requires some amplification.
In writing about the controversy surrounding Jerzy Kosinski's The
Painted Bird, James Park Sloan draws attention to the similarities
between the survivor's skills and the writer's talents. We should not
be surprised, he argues, that "a man who survived the war by living
a lie" should become "a practitioner of the liar's profession."'  But
if the writing of fiction remains the "liar's profession"-a discourse
which by its very terms eschews strict fidelity to historical truth and
thrives by blurring the distinction between memory and invention-it
permits, for these very reasons, the offering of testimonies that remain
beyond the ken of both legal and historical conventions of proof. For
the law cannot offer a solution to the paradox of the Cretan liar; it
cannot accommodate the witness who declares, "Everything I say is
a lie."
I do not suggest that the law would simply discredit the testimony
of a Maciek, one whose act of bearing witness was enabled by skills
of lying, though the Ziindel trial offers a bracing example of the kind
of vicious scrutiny to which survivor witnesses can be subjected.88
Yet even if the court finds credible the words of the witness who has
weathered the indignities of adversarial confrontation, because the
legal/historical interest in a witness remains largely instrumental, it
excludes precisely the kind of highly self-reflexive narration that we
find in Wartime Lies. The court's interest in character remains
focused upon the "truth of the said"; its concern is what was seen, not
the costs of seeing exacted upon the witness. Wartime Lies, by
contrast, suggests that reliable narrative, either in the form of juridical
86. Hannah Arendt and Karl Jaspers, Correspondence, ed. Lotte Kohler and Hans Saner
(New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1992), 54.
87. Sloan, 53.
88. Ztlndel's attorney, Douglas Christie, "engaged in brutal cross-examinations of survivor
witnesses, seeking to undermine their testimony, cast doubt on their suffering and deprive their
experiences of any real significance." Manuel Prutschi, "The Ztndel Affair," in Antisemitism
in Canada- History and Interpretation, 252. Commentators observed that such tactics probably





Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 1995
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities [Vol. 7: 367
testimony or historical account, fails to comprehend the experience of
the survivor sustained through evasion and invention. The novel
permits us to view the survivor as something more than a mere
instrument for the securing of a historical or juridical record; we can
hear the voice of the self tainted by its fully justified acts of sur-
vival." In this regard, we can appreciate how the text's ambivalent
status as a novel supports, and harmonizes with, its specific content:
by giving full voice to the survivor's experience, Wartime Lies neces-
sarily renders unsteady the very boundary between memory and
invention that the law attempts to fix and police.
Thus, notwithstanding the narrator's own claim that the turn to
fiction proceeded from the pain of memory, I would argue that the
confines and exclusions of legal and historical discourses make, in the
case of this narrative of survival, the turn to fiction inevitable. This
inevitability, however, creates a final dilemma: By relying on the
discourse of fiction, the writer runs the risk of creating the suggestion
that everything is indeed a lie, a misrepresentation. Indeed, this is
precisely the controversy that has engulfed The Painted Bird, as some
critics have greeted the news that the novel is, in fact, fictional (an
odd revelation in the first place) as evidence that the larger history of
the mistreatment of the Jews by their Polish neighbors during the
Holocaust was itself the invention of a literary mind inclined to gross
exaggeration. One can, of course, respond to such thinking with a
general argument about the capacity of imaginative art to reveal
deeper truths without being anchored to the historical record literally
conceived. Wartime Lies, however, handles the problem of novelistic
veracity internally. We can now appreciate what at first glance
seemed anomalous: the novel's inclusion of details and incidents that
fail to advance the interests of fictional organization. By implicitly
insisting on its facticity through precisely the kind of superfluous
detail and implausible or attenuated causality that Maciek's aunt bans
from the discourse of fiction, the text is able to discredit the witness
at the same time that it preserves the truth of what he reports. In so
doing, the text submits itself as a novel, yet rhetorically contains and
defeats the conclusion that everything in the narrative is, in fact,
fiction.
89. • Shoshana Felman offers a reading of The Plague that locates in Camus's novel a similar
representational concern with testimony that contaminates the witness. See Shoshana Felman,
"Camus' The Plague, or a Monument to Witnessing," in Testimony: Crises of Witnessing in
Literature, Psychoanalysis, and History, ed. Shoshana Felman and Dori Laub (New York:
Routledge, 1992), 93-119.
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V. HISTORICAL FICTIONS, LEGAL FICTIONS
This delicate balance between invention and veracity is preserved
through the text's final contact with a world of misrepresentations.
After we are told in the final chapter that Maciek and Tania live in
postwar Cracow with "their new names and new lies," the narrator
reflects on the ultimate utility of these continuing deceptions:
Are these lies still useful? Is anyone taken in? You would not
think so. After all, it's true, there are Jews all over Cracow,
crawling out from every hole. The worst are the ones just back
from Russia, arrived with Russian troops, like lice on their
uniforms, only they are again Pan Doctor this and Pan Engineer
that, living in the same fancy apartments as before. Other Jews
spent the war in comfort too, right among us, eating our food,
usurping good Polish names, putting their neighbors in danger,
because, of course, we all knew; one could tell those Jews at a
glance even if they called themselves Sobieski. And please, how
many of them did we keep in a back room for just a pittance,
with them always complaining they had nothing left, as if money
mattered when you turn into black smoke going up a chim-
ney?'
By ironically identifying with the voice of the "typical" Pole, the
narrator brings the reader in contact with a final set of misrepresen-
tations, those that define the historical consciousness of the average
citizen. The narrator asks whether the strategic deceits of Maciek and
Tania can defeat these larger historical lies, but the text implicitly
raises a different question: Can the truth behind Maciek's mis-
representations ever defeat the misrepresentations that inform the
nation's historical "truth"? For the lies of the typical citizen must not
be confused with Maciek's. As Levi observes, "the acquired picture
of historically accepted events" effects "the silent transition from
falsehood to self-deception."'" This self-deception, Levi argues, is
useful to the citizen as he "is more easily believed by the judge, the
historian, the reader, his wife, and his children." 92 In contrast to
Maciek's self-deceptions, those of the citizens invite an opportunistic
and craven distortion of history. Wartime Lies suggests, then, a final
dispiriting paradox: Just as the truth of the boy's act of bearing
witness must speak through a discourse of fiction, the deeper, more
persistent lies remain in the larger historical record.
90. Begley, 194.
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But if history remains vulnerable to misrepresentation, we have
already observed the problems posed by relying upon the law as a
corrective. The Zundel trial, in which the procedural profile of the
case forced the court to decide, through adversarial proceedings,
whether the Holocaust happened, stands as but one provocative
example of the disutilities of the law. Not only did the juridical
conventions of proof force the court to question the admissibility of
historical evidence (in the form of Hilberg's expert testimony and the
army documentary), but they permitted the defense to produce its
own "experts," in this case the Holocaust "revisionist" Dr. Robert
Faurisson, a French literature professor who has made a second
career in questioning the Holocaust from the standpoint of its
technical feasibility.93 This latter point was not lost upon revisionists,
who later publicized the fact that Faurisson had received judicial
recognition as an expert. Thus the formal evidentiary agnosticism of
adversarial jurisprudence renders Anglo-American law a peculiar tool
for the protection of historical memory, one which may destabilize the
very boundary between truth and fiction that it attempts to police.
Yet these problems are not peculiar to American or Canadian
courts. This is underscored by the German experience with the
passage of the so-called "Auschwitz-lie" law in 1985. Opposed by the
Christian Democrats, the senior party of the ruling coalition, the bill
prohibiting Holocaust denials was subtly changed in committee to win
support among the government's conservative flank. In its altered
and approved form, the law now criminalizes two distinct statements
of denial: those that deny the death camps, and those that deny the
forced expulsion of "ethnic" Germans from the formerly German
provinces of Poland at the war's conclusion.94 A product of political
compromise, the text of the law now draws an implicit parallel
between the two historical events. That no group motivated by
hatred or anything else has ever denied the German expulsions seems
93. Without further explanation, the appellate court in Regina v. ZUndel notes that "the trial
judge, at the conclusion of a voir dire, ruled that Dr. Faurisson should be permitted to testify
as an expert witness on the same basis as Dr. Hilberg was allowed to testify, namely, whether
the German Government [sic] from 1933 to 1945 deliberately embarked on a scheme to
exterminate the Jews in Europe." Zandel, 31 Canadian Criminal Cases at 142.
Faurisson is best known in the United States in connection with the storm of controversy
unleashed by the publication of one of his revisionist tracts with an introduction by Noam
Chomsky defending Faurisson's freedom of speech. (Chomsky attacked the unauthorized use
of his piece by Faurisson's publisher.) For an excellent discussion of this controversy, see Pierre
Vidal-Naquet, Assassins of Memory, trans. Jeffrey Mehiman (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1992).
94. The relevant sections of the bill (passed as Einundzwanzigstes Strafrechtnderungsgesetz
[Twenty-first Law Modifying the Criminal Law] on June 13, 1985) were modified to criminalize
insults to persons who have suffered persecution under National Socialism "or any other form
of despotism and tyranny." See Roth, "Denial of Holocaust," 5; see also Stein, "History Against
Free Speech," 307-10.
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of little relevance.95 Nor does it redeem the law to mention that
similar analogies have been drawn by the historian Andreas
Hillgruber in his controversial work Zweierlei Untergang ("Two Kinds
of Ruin") which, without comment, juxtaposes the Final Solution and
the expulsions in a single study of the end of the Second World
War.96 Thus the differences between the destruction of European
Jewry and the forced migration of Silesian and East Prussian Germans
are erased both in the historical study and in the impersonal text of
the law. The very legal instrument meant to protect the survivors
from "insults" to the historical record becomes itself a source of new
insults.
CONCLUSION
If juridical, historical, and fictional discourses are all vulnerable to
charges of misrepresenting the past, does this suggest that all tools are
equally inadequate to further the end of responsible memory?
Gunther Grass's brilliant Dog Years describes the task facing the
writer. "Believe me Mattern," writes one of the novel's narrators,
"with your help we will work out a valid technique for getting at the
truth .... [T]his is a matter of vital necessity: we must... design a
window that will give us back our perspective."'
Wartime Lies, however, challenges the project of ever designing a
window that will provide a transparent view of the Holocaust.
Indeed, by instructing in the ways that juridical and historical
discourses can distort and constrict the historical record, the novel
implicitly critiques the position that would privilege representations
of the Holocaust cast in those impersonal terms.
At the same time, however, the novel complicates the notion that
"only art can convey the fullest meaning of the Holocaust ex-
perience."9 If art can portray meanings and experiences unavailable
to the law, it is not because the vision of the artist is more innocent
or unoccluded. To the contrary, Wartime Lies clarifies the affinities
between the novel's craft and the survivor's duplicities. If the novel
provides a window on the experience of survival, it reveals not
because of its discursive transparency, but because it permits us to
learn from the narrative's provocative opacity. Wartime Lies tells a
95. Conservative politicians argued that nations in the former Warsaw Pact omitted mention
of these forced migrations from their official histories.
96. Andreas Hillgruber, Zweierlei Untergang: Die Zerschlagung des Deutschen Reiches und
das Ende des europaischen Judentums [Two Kinds of Ruin: The Shattering of the German Reich
and the End of European Jewry] (Berlin: W. J. Siedler, 1986).
97. GtInter Grass, Dog Years, trans. Ralph Mannheim (New York: Harcourt, Brace &
World, 1965), 471.
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vital story through its own rhetoric of fact and concealment; it permits
the testimony of the tainted survivor witness to be admitted through
a fictional discourse that filters the truth through the confession of
misrepresentation. These misrepresentations can neither be erased by
the "innocent" history, nor silenced by the arm of the law. If the
novel can serve the ends of responsible memory, it is because the
survivor's truth can speak through the language of the dissembler.
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